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Working at the forefront of hermeneutical philosophy, widely known, inter alia, as 
mediator in seminal round tables on the gift and on forgiveness around Derrida and 
Marion, and combining a professorial position in Ireland with one in Boston, U.S.A., 
Professor Kearney is particularly well situated to reflect on the way out from the 
aporia generated by the attack on various locations on the eastern U.S.A. seaboard on 
11 September 2001, commonly known as ‘9/11’. With the article under discussion 
here (Kearney 2005), he does so in a journal published in South Asia yet 
electronically circulating world-wide, which adds another element of potentially 
global relevance to his argument. However, for such potential to materialise, a 
number of further conditions need to be fulfilled:  
 
1.  the attempt to adopt a truly global perspective;  
2.  the avoidance, therefore, of parochial myopias of a denominational and 
geopolitical nature;  
3.  and closer reflection on the practical mechanisms of reconciliation.  
 
My comments explore how these themes may illuminate and render even more 
effective Richard Kearney’s thoughtful and sympathetic argument.  
    Early in his argument, our author takes for granted that ‘9/11’ is to have an effect 
on inter-religious dialogue. But why should this be so? Must we assume that ‘9/11’ 
was part of a primarily religious conflictive interaction? The victims cannot all be 
taken to have been Christians, or even religious people, at all. The same holds for the 
U.S.A. at large, to which the victims largely belonged. And although the perpetrators 
may have justified their deeds in terms of their particular version of Islam, they did 
not in the least act with the mandate of all, or most, Muslims in the present world. I 
doubt whether ‘9/11’ can be legitimately construed to constitute a religious event. 
And if it cannot, what then is the place of religion in this context of a non-religious 
event? What is it in religions that suggests they have a role to play in the aftermath of 
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religion, implying that this is what the perpetrators were guilty of in addition to their 
heinous physical violence and the violation of common human combative codes), but 
does not offer an answer.  
    With rather a poetical or homiletic turn that is not supported by explicit discursive 
reasoning either, Kearney suggests that the perpetrators’ misappropriation of religion 
ought to be countered by a corresponding re-appropriation of non-violence among the 
other camp – loosely but significantly identified as ‘us’, ‘we’. But who is re-
appropriating what, here? The vision of non-violence has formed a widespread code 
governing intimate face-to-face relations in the sphere of kinship and co-residence in 
the majority of human societies throughout known human history (cf. van Binsbergen 
2001a), – long before it became a precept for the relations between non-kin and 
strangers, in the wider public space, in formal codes of law, ethical philosophies, and 
world religions. The vision of non-violence is nobody’s and everybody’s property. It 
calls for application, re-dedication, revival, rather than re-appropriation.  
    However, the operative word here is ‘we’, rather than ‘non-violence’. If such re-
dedication to non-violence, also in the public sphere, even in intercultural, interethnic, 
interreligious and intercontinental relations, is to provide ‘the solution’ to the ‘9/11’ 
aftermath, as Kearney suggests, this presupposes that there is one and only one 
problem: that there is a unanimous set of people (the unidentified ‘we’ featuring in 
Kearney’s argument) who are evaluating the events of ‘9/11’ (and the chain of events 
leading up to and following the ‘9/11’ drama) from a shared perspective, groping for 
one interpretation common to them all. However, the fundamental fact to face in the 
context of ‘9/11’ is that there are a number (at least two, probably several more) of 
distinct positions, from which very different evaluations will be attached to recent 
intercontinental history, including ‘9/11’.  
    When – as in the case of ‘ 9/11’ – a small set of humans are brought to violate 
widespread and fundamental codes such as the respect for human lives, for civilians, 
for the latter’s beloved ones, for other people’s property and the fruits of human 
labour (in the form of buildings and airplanes), for the orderly conduct of armed 
conflict, and even turn out to be prepared to sacrifice their own lives in the process, 
then, in principle, the whole of humanity qualifies as victims – materially, by 
association, vicariously, and by implication; and this even includes the perpetrators 
themselves, whose sense of historical injury and dehumanising hatred we, the other 
humans, can only begin to fathom inside ourselves. This implies the possibility of a 
‘we’ that encompasses the whole of mankind, and that contains in itself the conditions 
for all suffering and for all reconciliation.  
    Yet, unmistakably, Kearney’s ‘we’ means mainly ‘U.S.A. citizens and others 
identifying with them’, including himself. Admittedly, and somewhat courageously if 
considered from a mainstream U.S.A. standpoint, he qualifies the ‘we’ perspective in 
several ways: it should not imply condoning the torture of Iraqi and Guantanamo Bay 
prisoners; it should not imply the mutual demonisation in which not only the 
perpetrators but also the U.S.A. leadership have publicly engaged; it should combine 
a Christian inspiration with a Buddhist, Hinduist, and Graeco-Roman classical one, 
and even have some room for Muslim mysticism; it should not be entrapped in a 
naïve ‘we’/’them’ dichotomy; it should not fall into the Huntington (1996) trap of 
conceptualising the conflict in terms of a clash of civilisations (but neither overstress 
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qualifications, the ‘we’ in Kearney’s argument remains a North Atlantic ‘we’ that is 
loyal to U.S.A. concerns. It does not shun from criticism of the U.S.A. leadership, it 
does acknowledge the existence (but scarcely the contents) of a highly critical 
assessment of the U.S.A. performance like Virilio’s (2002), yet carefully matches 
such criticism with ample attention for no-nonsense patriotic statements of such 
hawks as Dooley and Hitchens, who are cited in (apparent?) approval. Even for an 
Irish intellectual there are, apparently, limits to what one can write if one has a part-
time professorship at Boston, which is from whose airport the ‘9/11’ airplanes took 
off on their way to destruction.  
    However, given his practical commitment to U.S.A. society Kearney probably 
needs to wrap up his unmistakable criticism in this way. He needs to create a context 
of mainstream credibility in which he can yet pose his question ‘How do we even 
begin to imagine pardoning Bin Laden?’ without immediately disqualifying this 
question as rhetorical, as implying ‘such pardon is impossible to imagine under 
whatever circumstances’.  
    Kearney claims that inhabitants of the North Atlantic (or rather, by implication, 
their intellectual, journalistic and political spokespersons) tend to look at 
contemporary wars ‘uniquely in terms of politics, economics and sociology’. Again 
he skips one step, failing to argue why sudden violent attacks on civil targets, without 
prior declaration of war and without being immediately claimed by a particular nation 
or political movement, qualify as ‘war’.
1 Somewhat uncritically, he adopts the naïve 
definition of the situation as offered by the U.S.A. leadership, in terms of ‘War of 
Terror’.  
    Probably Kearney’s hermeneutical position is primarily responsible for his seeing 
‘9/11’, legitimately, as a religious event: he is merely representing the protagonists’ 
own views of the matter. The demonising idioms, the emotional repertoire of images, 
employed by the leadership on both sides suggest that one is not dealing here with a 
secular conflict but with one saturated with religious overtones, on both sides. ‘Axis 
of Evil’ (in the idiom employed by the U.S.A. leadership) is not a secular but a 
religious term. Yet I suggest we must go beyond what Kearney advocates: we must 
not only discover the religious imagery here which we may at first have risked to 
ignore, – we must also analyze that religious imagery and see what implications it has 
for understanding, controlling, and resolving this intercontinental conflict that has 
already claimed many thousands of lives and that threatens to endanger world peace 
for decades to come. The gain of empathy and representation inherent in the 
hermeneutical position, may also be its loss: it allows us the identification and 
exegesis of the protagonists’ public pronouncements, but does not allow us to speak 
of their hidden or dissimilated agenda’s, let alone to analyse, distantly and 
objectifyingly, the political economy and other structural constraints to which the 
protagonists may be argued to be subjected even without them consciously, explicitly 
                                                 
1 Are we not all trying to interpret ‘9/11’? In a collection I edited recently, von Trotha (2003) 
insightfully argues that so-called ‘terrorist’ attacks constitute a totally new category of warfare in their 
own right, characterised inter alia by the fact that one derives one’s weapons not from the arms trade 
but from among the technological complexity and vulnerability of North Atlantic urban mass society 
itself: the Internet, civil aviation, postal services, the convergence of large numbers of people around 
train stations, etc.  
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usage in cultural anthropology (cf. Headland et al. 1990), hermeneutics allows us an 
emic analysis but not an etic one. The dilemma also reminds us of the classic 
Gadamer/Habermas debate of the 1960s-1970s – of which Ricoeur has been a major 
commentator. If, complementary to a hermeneutical perspective, we would feel free to 
adopt a distancing analytical perspective, we would ask ourselves whether the ‘9/11’ 
confrontation between the (dominant elites of the) North Atlantic region and the 
world of militant Islam, in addition to the emic religious overtones, is not also a 
rational conflict over scarce resources in the political and economic domain (on the 
U.S.A. side: solidarity with Israel, a new phase of geopolitical expansion into the 
Middle East, and reliance – for industry and for highly-valued individual mobility – 
on cheap mineral oil; on the side of the militant Islamists: acknowledgment of 
historical wrongs done to Muslims in recent global history, and recognition of the 
validity of the view that Islam as a path through modernity and globalisation offers a 
valid alternative to dominant North Atlantic patterns). Such an analytical perspective 
would do something very important that is utterly beyond the hermeneutical 
approach: it would allow us to view ‘9/11’ in terms of global hegemony and counter-
hegemony. In more practical terms, it would make it possible to contemplate the 
extent to which the U.S.A. leadership themselves may have been partly responsible 
for the escalation leading to ‘9/11’, so that the firm rhetorical distinction between 
perpetrators and victims begins to dissolve, and one obvious (if only partial) way out 
after ‘9/11’ would become discernable: trying to undo, on both sides, the conditions 
that led to such escalation. 
    If Kearney insists on the religious dimension yet takes his distance from 
Huntington, this makes sense. For Kearney the fact that the ‘9/11’ conflict has 
profound religious aspects, means not that it is unsolvable (Huntington), but, quite to 
the contrary, enables Kearney to point at the potential of religion to cross or overcome 
boundaries and to move towards reconciliation. In that respect his approach is far 
more sympathetic than Huntington’s. Yet it is similarly myopic in failing to explore – 
given the non-religious aspects of the conflict I have just indicated –non-religious 
roads to conflict resolution. Remarkably, Kearney insists – and this makes up most of 
his article – that religion has a great conflict-resolving potential, but  
 
1.  without offering an explicit argument as to why this should be so – and  
2.  while apparently glossing over the contradiction that both parties in the ‘9/11’ 
conflict articulate only their irreconcilable enmity, but not their preparedness 
towards reconciliation, in terms of the world religion they respectively adhere 
to. It is as if Kearney is saying:  
 
‘you who are casting your post-’’9-11’’ enmity in a religious idiom, and 
who are capitalising on the perennial association between religion and 
violence,
2 please realise that the same idiom contains such elements as 
                                                 
2 Kearney acknowledges the intellectual movement (Freud, Girard etc.) that sees religion as essentially 
a product of violence. I have no quarrel with Kearney’s rendering of that movement, however succinct, 
but I think the idea behind the movement is utterly one-sided. Both Kearney (2001) and I (van 
Binsbergen 1981, van Binsbergen & Schoffeleers 1985, and many later publications, largely available 
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elements also appear in other religions and worldviews, e.g. in those of 
South Asia’.  
 
    This is profoundly meaningful, yet two crucial conditions continue to inform the 
situation and render Kearney’s recommendations rather ineffective:  
 
1.  The overall appeal to wisdom traditions’ hermeneutical tolerance fails to 
identify  the specific social, political and communicative conditions under 
which the parties involved may reject, or may be prepared to adopt, the 
proposed shift from a conflictive and boundary-emphasising to a boundary-
crossing and reconciliatory selection from among the repertoire of their 
respective religion, as exponents of the long history of wisdom traditions in 
the world. Kearney’s strategy in his argument – even though it is published in 
a South Asian venue – is to address those in the North Atlantic with Christian, 
Buddhist and Hinduist identifications or sympathies, and show them – with 
considerable erudition and eloquence – how here a road to hermeneutic 
tolerance may be found which would allow them (‘us’) to forgive the 
perpetrators (but see above) of ‘9/11’. It is somewhat unfortunate that 
Kearney’s hermeneutical perspective does not extend beyond the dominant 
groups in the North Atlantic region, especially not to Muslims in general 
(including those many millions of Muslims currently residing in the North 
Atlantic), let alone the militant Islamists behind the ‘9/11’ attacks. Only 
towards the end of his argument there is a passing admittance that also Islamic 
spirituality provides examples of the hermeneutic tolerance that Kearney 
advocates as the way out. His argument would have been much more 
impressive if he would have explicitly addressed the crucial question as to 
what kind of perspective (religious, political, economic) one would have to 
offer to Muslims, and to militant Islamists particularly, in order to bring them 
to the point where reconciliation becomes possible and past deeds may be 
brought to redressive and reintegrative trial in mutual recognition of their 
unacceptability. Moreover, it would have been an impressive display of 
intercultural sensitivity if Kearney had acknowledged traditions of 
reconciliation world-wide, including those outside the established literate 
world religions, e.g. in the African and Native American context.
3 Kearney’s 
plea to let the world’s wisdom traditions do the work of reconciliation would 
have been much more effective, and convincing, if this plea had not stressed 
the North Atlantic region, philosophical and Christian/ theological tradition so 
                                                                                                                                            
at http://www.shikanda.net) have written extensive theoretical arguments on religion, and this is not the 
place for a debate on this point. Let me merely say this. In my opinion religion is not just about the 
transmutation or sublimation of violence. It is an (apparently almost inevitable) by-product of human 
thought organised into patterned action and relatively stable metaphors. It is risky to make 
presuppositions about an undocumented distant past (the Middle Palaeolithic) when we have evidence 
of interhuman violence but not of articulate speech. Yet under contemporary, literate conditions it is 
safe to say that violence may be as much a product of discursive thought (inter alia, religious thought), 
as that discursive thought (inter alia, religious thought) is a product of violence. 
3 On Africa, cf. Ngwane 1996; van Binsbergen 2003a.  
  5ethnocentrically – which is where his short excursion into South Asian 
wisdom traditions soon takes Kearney. If he mentions mysticism, why miss 
the golden opportunity of exploring Islamic mysticism (al-DJili, ibn al-‘Arabi, 
al-Hallaj, al-GHazzali, etc.) as a possible source of a wisdom that could well 
be persuasive to militant Islamists. If he mentions Aristotle, why not exploit 
the fact that Aristotle was transmitted to the North Atlantic through Islamic 
thinkers and left traces in Islamic thought even after al-Ghazzali had 
concluded the victory of theology over philosophy, in the world of Islam? The 
existence of an extensive and enduring Islamic wisdom tradition (Sufism, 
associated with its exponents’ woollen – Arab. suf – garments according to 
some popular etymology, but in fact the pursuit of (Greek) sophia, ‘wisdom’) 
is largely ignored by Kearney. This is all the more regrettable, because 
Sufism, much more than the formal conceptual and confrontational thought of 
militant Islamism, has been the popular Islam of the Middle Eastern and North 
African masses for almost a millennium now.
4 
2.  The public underpinning of either side’s post-’9/11’ position by reference to a 
religious idiom may be only a minority option. Kearney seems to preach for 
his own parish, which not only is limited to dominant groups in the North 
Atlantic region, but among the latter, to those with a Christian or South Asian 
religious identity or at least sympathy. Given high levels of secularisation, the 
set thus defined only comprises a minority of the current population of the 
North Atlantic region. How are the secularised others to be involved,
5 
including those who prefer to see the Christian idiom employed by the U.S.A. 
leadership as mere rhetoric? How are Muslims to be involved, without first 
being blackmailed into having to publicly denounce the militant Islamists and 
the, admittedly totally unacceptable, extremes to which the latter went in the 
context of ‘9/11’? Surely it would be an interreligious naivety, not to say 
insult, to expect Muslims to let other religious orientations than Islam inspire 
them towards an attitude of reconciliation that is, in the most literal sense, at 
the very heart of Islam. Are we seriously to consider the polysemy of the 
Judaeo-Christian  Bible’s Song of Songs, to which Kearney refers, as an 
argument that is going to win Muslims over towards reconciliation? Moreover 
                                                 
4 This is not an idle claim, but one based on my years of historical and ethnographical research on 
North African popular Islam, around 1970 – basis for a two-volume scholarly study now being 
finalised for publication.  
5 Failure to appreciate how the vast majority of the North Atlantic population is no longer actively 
committed to Christianity or Judaism also affects other parts of Kearney’s argument. Thus he claims 
that the tolerance between adversaries is to be increased by the realisation that they both belong to the 
Abrahamic tradition (but so do the opponents in the Northern Ireland conflict, and in most conflicts that 
have waged in Europe in the course of the last thousand years, including Christians’ treatment of Jews 
throughout that period), and also (Ricoeur) by reading each others’ sacred scripture. Again, the latter 
recommendation is correct in principle, but how is it going to have a genuine impact on the North 
Atlantic region today, and on North Atlantic / Muslim relations, if due to secularisation only a minority 
of North Atlantic inhabitants identify as active adherents of the Christian and Jewish faith any more, 
while Islam is establishing itself, in the same region, rapidly and self-confidently? Christianity may be 
the rhetorical and performative idiom of the U.S.A. leadership, but it is no longer the worldview of all 
U.S.A. citizens, let alone of all citizens of the rest of the North Atlantic region.  
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Tolstoy), the sensitivity politics of interreligious and intercultural 
hermeneutics would certainly abhor a situation where outsiders, strangers, to 
one’s own religious tradition are claimed to occupy a privileged vantage point 
from where to interpret one’s own religious tradition; such a claim smacks of 
condescension and hegemony (cf. van Binsbergen 2003b). How are Muslims 
to be involved in the post-’9/11’ reconciliation process, on the basis of their 
own spiritual traditions? This is for Muslims to say; and all non-Muslims need 
to do is to reserve seats for Muslims around the table, far more explicitly and 
generously than Kearney has managed to do in his argument, even though his 
argument was clearly written in the same spirit as my recommendation on this 
point.  
 
    Kearney’s plea for hermeneutical tolerance is sympathetic, timely and well-taken, 
but we need to be far more specific if we want it to work. The hermeneutical 
recognition of polysemy alone is not the answer to ‘9-11’. The point is not that words 
can be interpreted in so many ways at the same time. The point is, for instance, that, 
in the modern world, hardened positions of exclusion and enmity represent a violence 
of words simultaneous with – often even preceding – the physical violence of deeds, 
while state-of-the-art technologies lend to these violent words an unprecedented new 
power by diffusing them all over the globe, at the same time lending the technological 
means to bring them into violent practice. And the point is to recognise militant 
Islamism, not as an inevitable and perennial core of Islam, but as a recent and 
relatively deviant ideological product of the very same globalisation of our times
6 as 
has lend, to militant Islamism, its singularly widespread appeal (through globalised 
media) and (in the sense of von Trotha’s 2003 argument cited above) its singularly 
material destructiveness. Militant Islamism, as a performative and thus deliberately 
atavistic revival of jihadist tendencies of the times of the Prophet  ̣ammad, is not 
the intrinsic nor the inevitable format of contemporary Islam, but a re-invention, the 
result of the marriage between Islam and recent globalisation.  
Muh
  Anyway, given the links between words and violence, one place where 
reconciliation may be found is in the interstices between words and between 
messages, in silence.  
    But that is not the only place.  
    As Kearney suggests, a legal framework ensuring fair trial may also be a way to 
bring about ultimate reconciliation, and would certainly not stand in the latter’s way. I 
do agree on this point, and I am reminded of a case where the emphatic insistence on 
non-violent patterns of confession, forgiving and reconciliation, rather than on lawful 
punishment, may have prevented the catharsis that is needed for a true overcoming of 
the violence of the past: the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
7 
But, much like I myself in the latter work cited, Kearney does not give the reasons 
                                                 
6 In other words, I propose to analyse today’s contemporary militant Islamism from the same 
perspective as that which I applied elsewhere to Southern African ubuntu philosophy and to the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission; cf. van Binsbergen 2001b, 2004. My approach has 
however generated considerable controversy, cf. Bewaji & Ramose 2003.   
7 1994-1998; cf. Salazar et al. 2004 with references to the extensive literature; van Binsbergen 2004. 
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Ricoeur posits.
8  
    Another passage makes us wonder just how convincing Kearney’s discourse on 
law – or on Christianity – may be. When he refers in passing to ‘those discreet words 
[of Jesus] in the sand that resisted murder’ (cf. the book of John 8: 6 in the Christian 
New Testament) a number of points may be made. This passage is generally 
considered, among New Testament scholars, to be corrupt, a late insertion. The 
original Greek text has ‘earth’, not ‘sand’ (a significant distinction in a time when 
working out mathematical problems on sand was standard academic practice), and 
speaks of ‘writing’ but not of ‘words’ – it may have been magical or divinatory signs, 
or – as many commentators would have it – mere doodles to buy time. Most 
important, I am puzzled that Kearney accuses Jesus’ interlocutors in that situation of 
murderous intentions. In ways certainly to be abhorred from our present-day 
standpoint,
9 but legal at the time (the beginning of the Common Era), they were about 
to administer the standard communal punishment (death by collective stoning) for an 
individual act of transgression (adultery). In principle, murder is the infringement, not 
the implementation, of the law of the land. Theologically, Jesus’ reconciliatory action 
in this narrative illustrates how he offsets the New Law, which from a Christian 
standpoint he embodies (that of an accommodating love), against the Old Law, which 
from a Christian standpoint he is considered to render obsolete: that of formal 
strictness and retaliation. Kearney’s ethnocentric misreading of this passage (i.e. his 
projection, across time and space, of current North Atlantic notions of the lawful 
versus the unlawful termination of human life) shows how difficult it is, even for a 
hermeneutic philosopher of the first ranks and of long standing, to develop an 
intercultural hermeneutics of sufficient sophistication to cope with a situation like 
‘9/11’. Undeniably, by North Atlantic national versions of public law, and by the 
human rights code adopted by the great majority of states in the hope of thus 
rendering it universal, the perpetrators of ‘9/11’ acted criminally; yet in their own 
eyes they must have considered themselves legitimated by reference to some higher 
law, and in the process they were prepared to sacrifice not only other peoples’ lives 
but also their own. Reconciliation is only possible if we do not deny this conflict of 
perceptions of legality, but if, instead, we actively invent a discourse (cf. van 
Binsbergen 2003b, especially the introduction) in which, through creative symbolic 
sleight-of-hand, both perspectives may be recognised, accommodated and overcome.  
    Thus it is only in principle that Kearney is right in his claim that hermeneutic 
tolerance may be the way out of protracted violent conflicts such as in Palestine/ 
Israel, Northern Ireland, and Bosnia. As an instance of hermeneutic tolerance, the 
                                                 
8 The obvious reason, not likely to be found with Ricoeur, is that the opponents on both sides bring to 
the conflict and its subsequent reconciliation general notions of justice, punishment and retaliation 
which may be creatively addressed and negotiated in the course of reconciliation (especially by a 
skilful outsider), but hardly so creatively as to totally eclipse or obliterate these notions; therefore, any 
reconciliation that does not take such particularistic notions of justice into account, risks to remain on 
performative, unable to prevent that the conflict simmers on underneath as a form of resentment still 
demanding satisfaction.  
9 Informed as this standpoint is by the explicit formulation, canonisation, and globalisation, of ‘human 
rights’, cf. the 1948 United Nations Declaration, after the 1789 model of the French revolution.  
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followers, of Paul’s universalism has only limited applicability to such situations, 
pace Kearney. For although that foundation situation may have considerable appeal to 
Christians as a model for emulation, it was very small-scale, and it particularly lacked 
the history of accumulated collective violent trauma in a conscious, identity-
constructing historic process, which characterises all such protracted modern conflicts 
including that leading on to, and following, ‘9/11’. It is the historicity of identity 
formation through violence, which we have to deal with in the context of ‘9/11’, on 
both sides; and that has no parallels in the New Testament except perhaps (obliquely 
and in largely unarticulated form) in the confrontation between Jews and Romans 
(which, more than Paul’s universalism, may well have been the prime factor in the 
emergence of Christianity). Moreover, the subsequent two millennia of Christian-
Jewish relations (which, without much exaggeration, may be summarised as a long 
chain of intolerance, exclusion and violence inflicted upon Jews by Christians) has 
shown that Paul’s universalism has seldom allowed his spiritual heirs, the Christians, 
to effectively mobilise a similar hermeneutic tolerance towards the co-religionists of 
the founder of Christianity, the Jew Yoshua bar Miriam. Nor has the appeal to such 
hermeneutic tolerance, however admittedly foundational to Christianity (Badiou’s 
idea (2003) as cited by Kearney is correct but far from new), inspired the 
proclaimedly Christian U.S.A. leadership to employ that attitude in its stance vis-à-vis 
the perpetrators of ‘9-11’.  
    Therefore, after identifying this kind of hermeneutical tolerance as one of the 
ways out, Kearney would have been expected to spell out how it can be practically 
deployed in the present situation, by Christians not automatically practicing it, and by 
Muslims not likely to be impressed by it as long as it is presented in specifically 
Christian trappings. Of course Kearney far from suggests that such hermeneutical 
tolerance is specifically Christian: indeed, as I have argued elsewhere (van 
Binsbergen 2003a), any conflict resolution involving reconciliation depends on it, and 
it is particularly small-scale African societies that can be shown to have developed 
this socio-communicative technology to high levels of perfection. In my argument 
cited, I also explore the inner mechanisms of such reconciliation. These turn out to 
involve, inter alia: 
 
1.  the recognition that both sides in the conflict are, by their own standards and 
perceptions, right, and act in rational integrity; 
2.  secondly, the only way to reconcile two such positions is by a hermeneutics 
that is not only tolerant, but that is to be emphatically inventive and 
innovative: a new overarching discourse needs to be invented that, in the eyes 
of both parties, dissolves their irreconcilable positions of incompatible 
rightness into compromise – which requires a skilful and inspired, charismatic 
act of social communicative sleight-of-hand;  
3.  this can only be done by virtue of both parties recognising and affirming each 
other’s common humanity which they share – putting an end to all earlier 
rhetoric of mutual demonisation.  
 
  9    Following Ricoeur, and in a way remarkably similar to mine yet somewhat less 
concrete and practical, Kearney sees four benefits to come from an hermeneutics of 
tolerance:  
 
1.  an ethic of narrative hospitality (cf. my ‘recognition of a shared humanity’);  
2.  an ethic of narrative flexibility (cf. my ‘sleight-of-hand’);  
3.  narrative plurality (cf. my recognition that both parties are right and endowed 
with rational integrity);  
4.  the transfiguring of the past (cf. my ‘creative and innovative’); and is to 
ultimately lead on to  
5.  ‘exceptional moments (...) where an ethics of justice is touched by a poetics of 
pardon’.  
 
    I could not agree more. Yet my opening question remains: What is it in organised 
religion, that would privilege it to bring about these five stages, over and above other 
communicative and performative repertoires available in the modern world, despite 
the fact that the latter is by and large involved in a process of secularisation? Kearney 
tells us that the poetics of pardon is usually of a spiritual or religious nature, but does 
not argue his case. The extent to which, and the reason why, the process of 
reconciliation should have religious overtones, remains the crucial question behind his 
argument. It needs to be answered, especially in the light of the fact that both 
opposing parties so far have cast their demonising idiom in the terms of the world 
religion they claim to adhere to. And again, in Kearney’s concluding passage, there is 
the ominous ‘we’: for ‘us’, it is difficult to forgive the perpetrators of ‘9/11’ – but 
where is the empathic argument that makes their position at least understandable, and 
would allow ‘them’ to forgive ‘us’, or would allow humanity (‘history’) to forgive 
both ‘them’ and ‘us’?  
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